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ESSAY 
 
ARTICLE III DOUBLE-DIPPING: 
PROPOSITION 8’S SPONSORS, BLAG, 
AND THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST 
SUZANNE B. GOLDBERG† 
INTRODUCTION 
A major procedural question looms over the two marriage cases currently 
before the U.S. Supreme Court: Do the parties who seek to defend the 
marriage-recognition bans have standing to advance their views?1 The 
question arises because the governments that would have Article III standing, 
by virtue of their enforcement authority, are not defending their own laws.2 
 
† Herbert and Doris Wechsler Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Center for Gender & 
Sexuality Law, Columbia Law School. With thanks to Mary Anne Case, Pamela Karlan, Jean 
Love, Marty Lederman, Trevor Morrison, and, as always, Henry Monaghan.  
1 The Court posed standing questions as part of its grant of certiorari in the two cases. In 
Hollingsworth v. Perry (Perry V), the Court asked the parties to brief and argue the question 
“[w]hether petitioners have standing under Article III, §2 of the Constitution in this case.” 133 S. 
Ct. 786, 786 (2012). In United States v. Windsor (Windsor IV), the Court granted the petition of the 
United States and directed the parties to answer two procedural questions: “[(1)] Whether the 
Executive Branch’s Agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this 
Court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and [(2)] whether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in this case.” 133 S. Ct. 
786, 786 (2012). This Essay focuses on the Article III standing question in both cases. 
2 The Court has long held that governments have standing to defend their laws. See, e.g., 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (“[A] State clearly has a legitimate interest in the 
continued enforceability of its own statutes.” (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986))).  
By “government” in reference to the Windsor litigation, I mean the United States, which was 
the named defendant in the complaint, see Complaint at para. 12, Windsor v. United States 
(Windsor II), 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 10-8435), 2010 WL 5647015, and which 
filed the petition for certiorari, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, United 
States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 2012 WL 3991414 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012).  
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Instead, in Hollingsworth v. Perry, private parties are attempting to take up 
the state government’s mantle to defend Proposition 8, which withdrew 
marriage rights from same-sex couples in California.3 And in United States 
v. Windsor, five members of the House of Representatives leadership seek to 
defend the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)4 in the name of the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG).5 
As a preliminary matter, these parties’ formal authority to assert the 
government’s standing is questionable. In Perry, the California Supreme 
Court ruled that the ballot measure’s sponsors could act in the government’s 
stead to defend “their” initiative,6 but that ruling lacks support in California 
law.7 BLAG’s authority in Windsor is also fragile.8 BLAG did not obtain 
approval from the House of Representatives until nearly two years after 
first intervening to defend DOMA in federal court (and well after filing its 
petition for a writ of certiorari in Windsor).9 And even with that approval, 
 
For extended discussion of the authority of legislators and nongovernmental actors to defend 
statutes and initiated measures, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Private Parties, Legislators, and the 
Government’s Mantle: On Intervention and Article III Standing (Dec. 24, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2193601. 
3 Proposition 8 was proposed by ProtectMarriage.com and several individuals to override a 
California Supreme Court determination in earlier litigation that the “designation of marriage” 
cannot be withheld from same-sex couples in California. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 
453 (Cal. 2008); see also Perry v. Brown (Perry IV), 671 F.3d 1052, 1067 (9th Cir.) (describing the 
introduction and promotion of Proposition 8 in response to the California Supreme Court’s 
ruling), cert. granted sub nom. Perry V, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). Proposition 8 amended the California 
Constitution, providing that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized 
in California.” CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5. 
4 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). The plaintiff-respondent in Windsor challenges only Section 3 of 
DOMA, which states: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband 
and wife . . . .” Id. 
5 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, supra note 2, at 6. 
6 See Perry v. Brown (Perry III), 265 P.3d 1002, 1010, 1033 (Cal. 2011). 
7 The state’s initiative law focuses almost exclusively on the pre-passage procedure for quali-
fying ballot measures. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg, supra note 2, 
at 32-33, 33 n.15 (discussing the limited scope of California initiative law). Given the absence of 
fair or substantial state law support for the California Supreme Court’s ruling, that ruling is not 
binding on the federal courts for jurisdictional purposes. Cf. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 366 
n.14 (1990) (“[W]e have long held that this Court has an independent obligation to ascertain 
whether a judgment defeating the enforcement of federal rights rests upon a valid nonfederal 
ground and whether that ground finds fair or substantial support in state law.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 54-57 (discussing whether Congress has standing to seek 
enforcement of a federal statute). 
9 See H.R. Res. 5, 113th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2013) (enacted); see also Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the 
Motion of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives for Leave 
to Intervene, McLaughlin v. Panetta, No. 11-11905 (D. Mass. May 10, 2012) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ 
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BLAG represents only the House, rather than the full Congress that passed 
DOMA.10 In addition, in both Windsor and Perry, there are significant 
problems with the lower courts having permitted intervention at all.11 
There are two more fundamental difficulties with the Perry petitioners’ 
and BLAG’s claims to standing. First, each presents the Article III double-
dipping problem to which this Essay’s title refers. The problem arises 
because there are parties asserting the government’s interest and, therefore, 
the government’s standing, on both sides of each case.12 That is, the Cali-
fornia and United States governments have taken the position that their 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is unconstitutional while the 
Perry petitioners and BLAG seek to argue, also on the government’s behalf, 
that the exclusions are constitutional.13 
The second problem arises from the premise, essential to the standing 
claims of both the Perry petitioners and BLAG, that governments can 
confer their Article III standing on private actors and subsets of legislators. 
The difficulty is that the government’s standing derives from its interest in 
enforcing its laws, which is not an interest shared by either group.  
The remainder of this Essay elaborates these two points in the con-
text of the Perry and Windsor cases. I argue that both the double-dipping 
problem and the limits on a government’s ability to transfer its standing 
to private actors in this context leave Proposition 8’s sponsors and 
BLAG without Article III standing to press their positions. Nor can 
either group of would-be defenders demonstrate the “concrete and 
particularized” stake it would need to have standing in its own right14 
rather than on the government’s behalf.  
 
Opposition] (arguing at length against BLAG’s capacity to represent the House); infra notes 36-37 
and accompanying text (discussing BLAG’s intervention in this dispute). 
10 See Plaintiffs’ Opposition, supra note 9, at 32-33. 
11 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 14-18. The essence of the problem is that intervention re-
quires a cognizable interest closely related to the litigation. Initiative proponents and subgroups of 
legislators do not have this requisite interest for many of the same reasons that they lack standing. 
12 Parties seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction “must establish . . . a ‘personal stake’ in the 
alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him.” Raines v. Byrd, 
521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). For a 
discussion of the parties’ respective positions, see supra notes 3-5 and infra notes 15 & 18.  
13
 See infra text accompanying notes 15-19 & 33-38. 
14 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543-
44 (1986) (holding that a school board member who “has no personal stake in the outcome of the 
litigation” lacked Article III standing to represent the Board as a whole).  
16 Goldberg Final Post AU Edits.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  2/20/2013 2:19 PM 
2013] Article III Double-Dipping 167 
I. ARTICLE III DOUBLE-DIPPING 
In both Perry and Windsor, as just noted, the government entities that 
would ordinarily defend the challenged marriage laws have conceded that 
the laws are unconstitutional and should be invalidated.15 Yet the intervenors 
claim to represent the government’s interest in arguing that the measures 
should be upheld. This Janus-faced commitment to both sides of the cases, 
if permitted, renders the concept of the government’s interest incoherent 
for Article III purposes.16 
A. Double-Dipping in Perry 
In Perry, California’s Attorney General, as the state’s chief legal officer, 
asserted at the litigation’s outset that the government’s interest lay in 
opposing Proposition 8’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.17 In 
answer to the plaintiffs’ complaint, he wrote that “[t]aking from same-sex 
couples the right to civil marriage that they had previously possessed under 
California’s Constitution cannot be squared with guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment [of the federal Constitution].”18 Yet Proposition 8’s 
sponsors also claimed to assert the government’s interests, but from the 
opposite vantage point—arguing that numerous rationales justified California’s 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.19  
 
15 See Answer of Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. at 9-10, Perry v. Schwarzenegger 
(Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-2292), 2009 WL 1748382 [hereinafter 
Brown Answer]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Letter from the Attorney General to 
Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder 
Letter], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
16 State courts are free, within the limits of state law, to sanction this sort of split standing, 
but their determinations do not control federal standing analysis. See, e.g., Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 
490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not 
apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or 
controversy . . . .”); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (“Standing to sue 
in any Article III court is, of course, a federal question which does not depend on the 
party's . . . standing in state court.”).  
17 See Brown Answer, supra note 15, at 4 (admitting that “in his official capacity he is 
the chief law officer of the state; that it is his duty to see that the laws of the state are 
uniformly and adequately enforced”). 
18 Id. at 2; see also, e.g., id. at 3, 8, 10 (restating the Attorney General’s conclusion that Propo-
sition 8 violated the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee). 
19 See Perry IV, 671 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir.) (summarizing “four possible reasons offered” by 
Proposition 8’s sponsors in defense of the measure), cert. granted sub nom. Perry V, 133 S. Ct. 786 
(2012); id. at 1074 (characterizing the Perry petitioners as “assert[ing] the interests of the State of 
California”). Proposition 8’s sponsors were able to advance these arguments after the district court 
permitted them to intervene. See Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (recounting how Proposition 8’s 
sponsors intervened in the case). 
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Sensitive to the potential for a standing problem, the Ninth Circuit cer-
tified to the California Supreme Court the question whether Proposition 8’s 
sponsors could assert the state’s interest to defend the measure they had 
promoted.20 The state high court held that they could, reasoning that “when 
the public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged state law or appeal a 
judgment invalidating the law decline to do so, . . . the official proponents 
of a voter-approved initiative measure are authorized to assert the state’s 
interest in the initiative’s validity.”21 Affirming this substitutional standing 
for initiative sponsors, the court added that “the role played by the propo-
nents in such litigation is comparable to the role ordinarily played by the 
Attorney General or other public officials in vigorously defending a duly 
enacted state law and raising all arguable legal theories upon which a 
challenged provision may be sustained.”22  
The Ninth Circuit then held that it was “bound to accept the California 
court’s determination” regarding the proponents’ standing,23 while also 
acknowledging its obligation to conduct an independent Article III review.24 
“The People of California are largely free to structure their system of 
governance as they choose,” the court wrote, “and we respect their choice.”25  
 
20 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir.), certified question 
answered sub nom. Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011). 
21 Perry III, 265 P.3d at 1033. Presumably, even a weak defense by state officials would 
preempt Article III claims by the initiative sponsors, although this cuts against the California high 
court’s suggestion that the sponsors are best positioned, in nearly any case, to defend the People’s 
interests. As the California Supreme Court wrote: 
“Allowing official proponents to assert the state's interest in the validity of the initia-
tive measure . . . assures voters . . . that any residual hostility or indifference of 
current public officials to the substance of the initiative measure will not prevent a 
full and robust defense of the measure to be mounted in court on the people's 
behalf . . . .” 
Id. at 1006. 
22 Id. at 1023. Interestingly, Proposition 8’s sponsors did not make this argument in their 
intervention motion. Instead, they argued that they had “unique legal statuses regarding [the] 
initiative” because they “ha[d] indefatigably labored in support of Proposition 8.” Proposed 
Intervenors’ Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene, and Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion to Intervene at 8-9, Perry I, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (No. 09-2292), 2009 WL 1499309.  
23 Perry II, 671 F.3d at 1072; see also id. at 1075 (“Because the State of California has Article 
III standing to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8, and because both the California 
Constitution and California law authorize [standing for] the official proponents of an initiative,” 
when government officials do not defend, Proposition 8’s sponsors “are proper appellants.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
24 See id. at 1074 (“To be clear, we do not suggest that state law has any ‘power directly to 
enlarge or contract federal jurisdiction.’” (quoting Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 1981))). 
25 Id. at 1073. 
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But, given that California was a full participant in the litigation and took 
a position in the case, the Perry petitioners can stand in for the state only if 
the state can bifurcate its Article III standing, retaining some for itself and 
apportioning the rest to a party on the other side of the case.26 In other 
words, the state would have a permanent interest in defending its laws that 
it could confer on others whenever state officials determined that a chal-
lenged law was invalid.27 Indeed, per the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the state 
would have categorical control over how and when to bifurcate its standing.28 
Treating ballot measure sponsors as though they were the state’s agents 
or outside counsel does not alleviate the tensions associated with this 
concern about double-dipping. Given the Attorney General’s position that 
Proposition 8 is invalid, the sponsors cannot serve as the state’s agents 
unless the government is able to split its interest in two. The sponsors also 
cannot plausibly obtain outside-counsel status when they are arguing against 
 
26 One might argue that the government does not deploy its Article III interest if it opposes, 
rather than defends, a law. Under this view, a government only has an Article III interest if and 
when it seeks to enforce its laws. But the argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the state’s 
interest in enforcing its laws is not a free-floating one that can be transferred, if not used by the 
state, to another party with no cognizable interest in enforcement. See infra text accompanying 
notes 48-53. Second, the government can also be said to have “used” its interest by exercising its 
prerogative not to enforce a challenged law. In other words, the government’s interest is not in 
enforcement absolutely, but instead in taking a position on whether or not it should be 
enforcing a given measure. 
Separately, if the Governor and Attorney General had taken opposing positions regarding Proposi-
tion 8’s constitutionality, there would be a question whether federal courts would have to grant standing 
to whichever government official sought to defend the law. While that is not the case in Perry, the 
Article III double-dipping analysis suggests that, in the context of such a policy dispute, the state would 
have to determine which official’s interest trumped for federal standing purposes. 
27 An argument that the sponsors were merely stepping into the shoes of the governmental 
defendants other than the Attorney General is not tenable here because those government actors 
participated in the Perry litigation; they responded to the plaintiffs’ complaint and then accepted 
the district court judgment that Proposition 8 was invalid. They did not exercise their right to file 
an appeal or make their acceptance of the judgment contingent on the sponsors’ appeal. In other 
words, all of the official defendants participated for themselves; the initiative sponsors thus could 
not have stood in their stead. See Perry IV, 671 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir.) (summarizing the case’s 
procedural history), cert. granted sub nom. Perry V, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
28 See id. at 1064 (explaining that “[i]t is for the State of California to decide who may assert 
its interests in litigation”). Although the California Supreme Court held that the official sponsors 
were “the most obvious and logical persons to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity 
on behalf of the voters who enacted the measure,” based on “their unique relationship to the 
initiative measure under [the California Constitution] and the relevant provisions of the 
[Elections] Code,” Perry III, 265 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011), there seems to be nothing in the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis to prevent California from selling its standing to the highest bidder or, 
less provocatively, from having a lottery among all who had demonstrated their commitment by 
promoting the initiative. The lottery suggestion assumes that there is a limit to the number of 
parties on which a state can confer its Article III interest, but in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, there 
is no indication that such a limit exists. See Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1064. 
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the government’s position. Further, standing derives from the parties in 
a case; counsel does not gain the requisite Article III stake through its 
work on a party’s behalf.  
Nor can the Ninth Circuit’s characterization of the sponsors as repre-
sentatives of the People rather than the government eliminate the tension 
arising from these competing assertions—and conceptions—of the govern-
ment’s interest. In its opinion, the court stressed, for example, that “the 
People have an interest in the validity of Proposition 8” and that “under 
California law, Proponents are authorized to represent the People’s interest.”29 
But the California Supreme Court itself made clear that to advance the 
People’s interests is to advance the state’s interests.30 Indeed, it would make 
little sense for the sponsors’ standing to be contingent on public officials’ 
actions if the People’s interests were distinct from the state’s. In addition, if 
the state’s interests that give rise to standing are separable from the Peo-
ple’s, the potential for double-dipping escalates, with the People and the 
state both entitled to claim the government’s stake for Article III purposes. 
Further, this sort of generalized “People’s interest” is precisely what 
standing doctrine has long rejected; only a radical jurisprudential change 
would permit such a shift in Article III jurisprudence.31 
Finally, permitting Article III double-dipping puts federal courts in the 
position of giving second opinions to a government absent a genuine 
conflict between that government and the party that sued it. In Perry, for 
example, there is no dispute between the state and the plaintiffs about 
whether Proposition 8 should be enforced; the state’s “stake” in defending 
the law is thus an empty one. If Proposition 8’s proponents are allowed to 
claim this empty interest to obtain federal review, their engineered, artificial 
conflict becomes the basis for obtaining federal court guidance about the state’s 
nonenforcement decision.32 
 
29 Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1073; see also Perry III, 265 P.2d at 1006 (“[I]n most instances it may 
well be an abuse of discretion for a court to fail to permit the official proponents of an initiative to 
intervene . . . to protect the people’s right to exercise their initiative power . . . .”). 
30 See Perry III, 265 P.2d at 1006 (deciding that “California law authorizes the official propo-
nents . . . to appear in the proceeding to assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s validity”). 
31 See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
32 Arguably, this amounts to an impermissible request for an advisory opinion per Muskrat v. 
United States, where the Court found that a request was not justiciable where the defendant 
government had “no interest adverse to the claimants.” 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911). Either way, 
Article III remains a problem for these defendant-intervenors, who, like other parties seeking 
federal court review, must have a “direct stake in the outcome.” See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 
54, 62 (1986) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972)).  
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B.  Double-Dipping in Windsor 
In Windsor, the double-dipping problem first arose when the United 
States, as defendant, agreed that DOMA was invalid, but a subset of its 
lawmakers sought to invoke the government’s interest to assert the statute’s 
constitutionality.33 While there are situations in which distinct parts of the 
federal government have been permitted to appear on both sides of a case,34 
the circumstance of dueling lawmakers and law enforcers regarding the 
continued viability of a federal marriage law poses troubling questions about 
the degree to which the government’s Article III standing can be stretched 
to enable federal adjudication of policy disagreements.  
 More specifically, the United States, through the Department of 
Justice (DOJ), began to “advocate that the statute be ruled unconstitu-
tional” following the Attorney General’s announcement that the Obama 
administration would not defend DOMA.35 Shortly after, BLAG, a five-
person body consisting of House majority and minority leaders,36 
intervened to take “the laboring oar in defense of the statute,”37 and 
federal courts throughout the country accepted its intervention on behalf 
of the House of Representatives.38  
 
33 Windsor II, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
34 See Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue 
Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 910-11 (1991) (discussing examples of interbranch litigation). 
35 See Windsor v. United States (Windsor III), 699 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 786 (2012); see also Holder Letter, supra note 15 (announcing and explaining DOJ’s decision 
not to defend DOMA). 
36 See R. OF THE HOUSE OF REPS., R. II, § 8 (2013), available at http://clerk.house.gov/ 
legislative/house-rules.pdf (describing the composition of BLAG). Only three of BLAG’s five 
members, all Republicans, voted in favor of defending DOMA. See Press Release, John A. 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, House Will Ensure DOMA Constitutionality 
Is Determined by the Court (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://boehner.house.gov/news/ 
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=228585 (explaining that BLAG directed the House General 
Counsel to initiate a legal defense of DOMA and that “[t]his action by the House will ensure that 
this law’s constitutionality is decided by the courts, rather than by the President unilaterally”); 
Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Pelosi Letter to 
Speaker Boehner on House Counsel Defense of DOMA (Mar. 11, 2011), available at 
http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2011/03/pelosi-letter-to-speaker-boehner-on-house-
counsel-defense-of-doma.shtml (noting that BLAG “voted this week by a 3-2 margin to direct the 
House General Counsel to initiate a legal defense of [DOMA]”). 
37 See Windsor III, 699 F.3d at 176.  
38 See Windsor v. United States (Windsor I), 797 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating 
that “BLAG has a cognizable interest in defending the enforceability of statutes the House has 
passed”); see also, e.g., Revelis v. Napolitano, 844 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (finding 
that BLAG had Article III standing because “[t]he House has an interest in defending the 
constitutionality of legislation which it passed when the executive branch declines to do so”). 
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Unlike in Perry, where the government defendants did not appeal the 
district court’s decision,39 the United States appealed DOMA’s invalidation, 
explaining that although it agreed with the district court’s determination, it 
would continue to enforce the law.40  
But the difficulties for BLAG, are several, even with the United States’ 
certiorari petition having been granted. First, BLAG’s authority is limited 
to asserting the interests of the House of Representatives, at most.41 More 
generally, even if BLAG were accepted as a representative of the legislative 
branch, it is not clear that Article III does or should permit the federal 
government to bifurcate its standing for purposes of having federal courts 
resolve policy disputes between the executive and legislative branches.42  
One might argue that lawmakers have a direct stake in defending the 
laws they have passed so that they are not double-dipping into the govern-
ment’s enforcement interest but instead are asserting the legislature’s 
independent Article III interest in the case. This theory arguably grows out 
of INS v. Chadha, in which the Court allowed Congress to defend an 
immigration law when the enforcing agency, the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service, agreed with the plaintiff that the law was unconstitutional.43 
The Court wrote that it had “long held that Congress is the proper party to 
defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant 
charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is 
inapplicable or unconstitutional.”44  
 
39 See Perry II, 628 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.) (stating that the named government defendants 
did not appeal the district court order enjoining them from enforcing Proposition 8), certified 
question answered sub nom. Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2011). 
40 See Windsor III, 699 F.3d at 176 (stating that “[n]otwithstanding the withdrawal of its 
advocacy, the United States continues to enforce Section 3 of DOMA, which is indeed why 
Windsor does not have her money”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, supra note 
2, at 6 (explaining that the United States filed its appeal to “ensur[e] that the court had Article III 
jurisdiction to enter judgment for or against the federal officials tasked with enforcing Section 3”). 
Based on this continued enforcement, the Second Circuit affirmed that BLAG did not need 
to establish independent Article III standing. See Windsor III, 699 F.3d at 176. At the Supreme 
Court’s request, an amica curiae filed a brief that argues against the United States’ standing to 
seek review when it agrees with the lower court’s decision on the merits. See Brief for Court-
Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction at 23-24, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-0307 
(U.S. Jan. 24, 2013), 2013 WL 315234. 
41 See R. OF THE HOUSE OF REPS., supra note 36, at R. II, § 8; see also supra note 9 and 
accompanying text (discussing the House’s post-hoc endorsement of BLAG’s position). 
42 Full exploration of this question is beyond this Essay’s limited scope; my aim here is simply 
to flag this issue as a serious hurdle to BLAG’s standing claim and to explore related concerns. 
43 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983). 
44 See id. at 940.  
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But there are difficulties with this theory. First, and most basically, the 
Court in Chadha did not grant standing to the House alone. Instead, both 
the House and Senate had passed a joint resolution authorizing intervention 
by Congress as a whole.45 Second, as I will discuss in the next Part, Con-
gress may not have a cognizable Article III interest in defending a chal-
lenged law, given that it lacks the power to enforce that law.  
Further, by permitting lawmakers to assert the government’s inter-
ests contrary to the stated positions of government officials authorized 
to enforce the challenged law,46 federal courts would, in effect, be 
transferring enforcement power from one branch to another. Yet, again, 
it is not clear why federal courts can use their jurisdictional authority to 
reshape the enactment–enforcement relationship between legislative and 
executive branches in this way.47  
II.  GOVERNMENTAL STANDING FOR ACTORS WITHOUT 
GOVERNMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
The petitioners in Perry face an additional procedural problem. California’s 
stake in the case derives from the state’s authority to enforce its marriage 
laws, but the sponsors who seek to assert the government’s interest are not 
government agents of any kind and thus, have no connection to the gov-
ernment’s enforcement powers. If federal courts give states the discretion to 
unmoor standing from enforcement authority, Article III’s requirement that 
a party have a direct and particularized interest in a case becomes nothing 
more than a nominal obstacle, easily sidestepped whenever states are so 
inclined. This Section explores several possible responses to this concern but 
 
45 See id. at 930 n.5, 939-40; see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 n.20 
(1997) (summarizing Chadha as standing for the proposition that Congress was a proper party to defend 
a statute “where both Houses, by resolution, had authorized intervention in the lawsuit”). 
46 The New Jersey legislature succeeded in doing something similar in Karcher v. May, where 
the defendant state officials declined to defend a moment-of-silence law. 484 U.S. 72, 75 (1987). 
The legislature authorized its leadership to seek the enforcement of the law. See id. (“When it 
became apparent that neither the Attorney General nor the named defendants would defend the 
statute, Karcher and Orechio, as Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly and President of 
the New Jersey Senate, respectively, sought and obtained permission to intervene as defendants 
on behalf of the legislature.”). 
47 This point raises broader questions about the sustainability of the Court’s theory in 
Chadha as well as Chadha’s specific applicability here. Although full exploration is, again, beyond 
this brief Essay’s scope, it bears noting that, even in Chadha, the Court grounded its endorsement 
of Congressional standing in only two cases, and neither case is actually on point. Instead, Cheng 
Fan Kwok v. INS discussed the Court’s appointment of a member of the bar to present argument 
as amicus curiae. 392 U.S. 206, 210 n.9 (1968). The other case, United States v. Lovett, does not 
discuss standing at all. 328 U.S. 303, 306 (1946) (observing that Congress passed a joint resolution 
authorizing an attorney to represent its interests). 
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concludes that stand-ins for a state must have a link to the state’s enforcement 
power lest Article III standing requirements be contorted beyond recognition.  
One response to the enforcement concern might be that California is 
simply assigning its interest in enforcing approved initiatives to the 
measures’ sponsors, just as a government can assign its interest in a qui tam 
case.48 There is an important difference, however, between the interest 
asserted in a case such as Perry and the financial interest associated with a 
qui tam fraud prosecution. Perry involves the government’s power to 
recognize marriages and to confer benefits based on that status.49 This is a 
power that only the government can exercise. If the state were to delegate 
the practice of validating or recognizing marriages to private actors, those 
actors might have an enforcement interest alongside, or perhaps in place of 
the state. But under California law, and indeed, the law of all fifty states, the 
validation of civil marriages is a matter exclusively within the state’s authority.50  
Even if California could assign its interest in the case, California law 
does not confer this interest on ballot initiative sponsors. Instead, the state’s 
initiative-law framework specifies the procedural steps, such as petition 
approval and signature gathering, that sponsors must take to qualify a 
measure for a statewide ballot.51 It provides, too, that sponsors can exercise 
control over arguments for the measure that appear in the official voter 
information guide published by the Secretary of State.52 But these rules 
give proponents a procedurally focused interest; if the state deviated from 
 
48 See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 
(2000) (affirming “the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact 
suffered by the assignor”). Of course, California has not purported to make a similar assignment 
here, but to further the analysis, I will set the double-dipping issue aside for the moment. 
The related idea that the enforcement-authority deficit can be avoided because the proposi-
tion’s sponsors are functioning as the state’s agents is also unavailing factually and analytically for 
the reasons discussed earlier. Notably, too, the government defendants declined to appeal, and the 
proponents filed their appeal on their own behalf, not on behalf of the state. See Perry I, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 928-29 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry IV, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted sub nom. Perry V, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
49 See Perry IV, 671 F.3d at 1063 (“[A]ll parties agree that Proposition 8 had one effect only. It 
stripped same-sex couples of the ability they previously possessed to obtain from the State, or any 
other authorized party, an important right . . . .”). 
50 The practice of vesting the state’s authority in private parties for marriage ceremonies 
does not diminish the state’s comprehensive control over marriage. Those delegations to clergy 
and others are entirely for ceremonial purposes; in all cases, it is the state that controls the issuance 
of marriage licenses. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 421 (West 2012) (“Before solemnizing a marriage, 
the person solemnizing the marriage shall require the presentation of the marriage license.”). 
51 See Perry III, 265 P.3d 1002, 1015-17 (Cal. 2011) (reviewing California’s constitutional and 
statutory provisions that govern the initiative processes). 
52 Id. at 1024. 
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these provisions, the proponents might suffer a distinct and palpable 
injury sufficient to justify Article III standing.53 Once an initiative is 
presented and passed, however, the initiative’s sponsors’ formal interest 
in the matter comes to an end. 
Against this backdrop, sponsors might try to analogize themselves to 
elected legislators working on their constituents’ behalf, but that argument, 
too, is unavailing for Article III purposes because individual lawmakers do 
not have a government interest sufficient for standing. In Raines v. Byrd, for 
example, Congress authorized lawmakers to challenge the Line Item Veto 
Act on constitutional grounds.54 Six members filed suit,55 each arguing that 
the veto law unconstitutionally diminished his political power.56 The Court 
held, however, that the lawmakers’ alleged injuries were “wholly abstract 
and widely dispersed” and that “these individual members of Congress do 
not have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this dispute and have not alleged a 
sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing.”57  
Nor can the sponsors succeed by claiming standing based on their 
taxpayer or citizenship status. As the Court has affirmed repeatedly: to 
qualify as a party with Article III standing, “[a]n interest shared general-
ly with the public at large in the proper application of the Constitution 
and laws will not do.”58 In a taxpayer’s action to enforce a constitutional 
provision, for example, the Court explained that a claim to have the law 
enforced in a particular way “is surely . . . a generalized grievance 
. . . since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and ‘common to 
all members of the public.’”59 Nearly a century ago, the Court similarly 
rejected a taxpayer and citizen activist’s challenge to the Nineteenth 
Amendment, holding that his concerns about the diminished effective-
ness of “free citizens’” votes and the rise in election expenses were 
insufficiently particularized to generate Article III standing.60  
 
53 Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1939) (finding standing for legislators where 
lawmaking rules were allegedly disregarded in ways that nullified legislators’ votes). 
54 521 U.S. 811, 815-16 (1997) (“The Act provided that ‘[a]ny Member of Congress or any indi-
vidual adversely affected by [this Act] may bring an action, in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any 
provision of this part violates the Constitution.’” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). 
55 See id. at 814. 
56 See id. at 837 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The appellees thus articulated their claim as a 
combination of the diminished effect of their initial vote and the circumvention of their right to 
participate in the subsequent repeal.”). 
57 Id. at 829-30. 
58 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). 
59 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U.S. 
633, 636 (1937) (per curiam)).  
60 Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922). 
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The sponsors also cannot overcome their lack of an individualized stake 
in the outcome by claiming to act on the government’s behalf. As the 
Supreme Court has explained, the “expression of a desire that [a law] as 
written be obeyed” is an interest of the sovereign, which has a “direct stake” 
in defending its laws.61 But an Article III interest in the rule of law is not 
available to citizens with no individualized injury.62 Even the state’s formal 
authorization cannot overcome individuals’ “direct stake” deficit. As the 
Court wrote in Raines, Article III’s standing requirement cannot be erased 
“by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not 
otherwise have standing.”63  
Finally, the initiative’s sponsors might argue that for the purposes of 
standing analysis, they are most analogous to a full legislature. For support, 
they could conceivably invoke two Supreme Court rulings recognizing that 
a lawmaking body (in one case, Congress, and in the other, a state legisla-
ture) had Article III standing to defend a law.64 Yet two points bear noting 
here. First, the analogy is factually weak. Proposition 8’s sponsors did not 
enact Proposition 8; the voters did. Consequently, Proposition 8’s sponsors 
are more like individual lawmakers, and while individual lawmakers some-
times have a cognizable interest in the voting process,65 they do not have an 
Article III stake in a statute’s enforcement. Second, even if sponsors are 
treated as the voters’ representatives, voters’ interest in the general 
enforcement of the law has been deemed, as just discussed, too generalized 
to support Article III standing.66  
If the Court is prepared to dramatically enlarge the idea of a “direct 
stake” in the context of initiated legislation, then the sponsors might 
possibly stand in for the state (though the double-dipping problem 
remains). But the linchpin of the sponsors’ standing claim in Perry is that 
state officials are not defending Proposition 8 as they would like. Without a 
significant doctrinal shift, that complaint cannot carry the Perry petitioners 
across the Article III threshold. 
 
61 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986). 
62 See id.  
63 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)). 
64 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (recognizing Congress’s standing); Karcher 
v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1987) (acknowledging state legislature standing). 
65 See supra note 53 (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 445-46 (1939)). 
66 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine related to generalized 
grievances). 
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CONCLUSION 
If Proposition 8’s sponsors are turned away from the Supreme Court 
on standing grounds, some fear that public frustration and further 
diminution of judicial legitimacy will follow.67 Similar, though lesser, 
concerns might arise if the Court finds that BLAG does not have 
standing to advance its defense of DOMA.68 
While I have addressed these concerns at length elsewhere,69 it bears 
noting here that both Proposition 8’s sponsors and BLAG have, and have 
had, other ways to participate vigorously in defending the challenged 
measures. There is no question that under California law, a ballot initiative’s 
sponsors have standing in state court to defend the measure they promot-
ed, up through the state supreme court.70 Likewise, in Windsor, proponents of 
DOMA in Congress can make their views known to the Court even if they 
lack standing to seek federal appellate review.71 
If enthusiasm for a measure were sufficient to create a cognizable 
stake in a case for Article III purposes, Proposition 8’s sponsors and 
BLAG would surely be among those first in line. But it is not. Unless 
the Court is prepared to blur Article III jurisprudence beyond recogni-
tion, neither Proposition 8’s sponsors nor BLAG can derive standing by 
asserting the government’s interest, particularly when the government 
has already done so on the other side. 
 
 
 
 
 
67 But see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (rejecting a taxpayer’s stand-
ing to seek disclosures from the CIA and observing that “[l]ack of standing within the narrow 
confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert [one’s] views in the political 
forum or at the polls”). 
68 I say “lesser” because, as noted earlier, the United States sought and was granted the writ 
of certiorari in the case. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment, supra note 2; Windsor 
IV, 133 S. Ct. 786, 786 (2012) (granting certiorari). 
69 See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 36-43. 
70 See supra note 16. 
71 The circuits have split over whether proposed intervenors must establish Article III standing 
in addition to satisfying the intervention requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
24. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (discussing the circuit split). But even if 
BLAG had been displaced from party status because of its lack of standing, it could have filed an 
amicus brief, as it has done in other cases. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 n.2 (1997) 
(describing BLAG’s amicus brief). Or, if it wanted to introduce evidence, it could have sought 
status as a litigating amicus. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 5, 41-42 (arguing that litigating amicus 
status is more appropriate than party status for subsets of lawmakers, such as BLAG).  
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